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Insider Trading as a Signal of Private Information 
Aswath Damodaran & Crocker H. Liu 
New York University 
There is substantial evidence that insider trading is present around corporate 
announcements and that this insider trading is motivated by private information. Using real 
estate investment trusts that choose to reappraise themselves as our sample, we establish that 
the appraisals contain information, but find no market response to the public announcement of 
this information in these appraisals. We consider two possible explanations for this 
inconsistency: the first that the appraisal information is not highlighted in earnings reports and 
hence remains unobserved; and the second that insiders trade on the appraisal information in 
the time that elapses between the appraisal and its public announcement. We find strong 
support for the second hypothesis, with insiders buying (selling) after they receive favorable 
(unfavorable) appraisal news, especially for negative appraisals. We also find that positive 
(negative) appraisals and net insider buying (selling) elicit significant positive (negative) 
abnormal returns during the appraisal period. 
There is substantial evidence that insider trading is present around corporate announcements 
and that this insider trading is motivated by private information. Studies also document that insiders 
who have access to private information can outperform the market.1 In the sequence of information 
events starting with the revelation of the private information to insiders followed by revelation of this 
information to the public and then by secondary reports from analysts, researchers have focused on the 
public announcement stage, with the period preceding these announcements examined for evidence of 
insider trading and abnormal price reaction. Most tests of insider trading have been indirect because 
                                                          
1 Jaffe (1974a, 1974b) and Finnerty (1976) examine abnormal returns around months in which insiders trade 
intensively and find support for the finding that there are substantial positive (negative) returns following insider 
buying (selling). Givoly and Palmon (1985) extend these studies by correlating insider trading with subsequent 
news releases and find that insiders do not trade in anticipation of news releases. In contrast to this, Copeland and 
Lee (1988), Hirschey and Zaima (1989), and John and Lang (1991) find evidence that significant insider trading is 
present around corporate announcements. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) also report substantial insider trading 
beginning one month before the announcements of corporate takeovers and find that one half of the price 
reaction takes place before the announcement. 
researchers have been stymied by the fact that the timing of when private information is revealed to 
insiders in the firm, as well as the content of this information, is generally unobservable.2 
One feature of the current study is that we are able to obtain a private information attribute 
that is available and known only to insiders as of a certain month. This affords us the opportunity to 
study the initial stage in the information dissemination process when private information is revealed to 
insiders and to explore how insiders use this information prior to the public announcement of this 
information. More specifically, we are able to examine directly the link between insider trading and 
abnormal price reaction to the sequence of information revelation starting from the time that 
information is revealed to insiders, continuing on through to the public announcement of this 
information, and ending when this information is repackaged and revealed to the general public. 
We use data on equity real estate investment trusts (EREITs) and real estate operating 
companies as a vehicle to test the above hypotheses. EREITs and real estate companies offer a unique 
setting to test these conjectures because real estate investment trusts (REITs) sometimes use outside 
appraisers to revalue the properties that they own. The resulting appraised values as well as the month 
of the appraisal are reported in subsequent earnings announcements. These appraisals are also 
summarized and reported by external services to subscribing investors at a later date. Since a substantial 
time period elapses between the appraisal (the private information attribute) and the public 
announcement of appraisal values, there is a significant period of time during which insiders in the firm 
know the appraisal value while outsiders do not. Consequently, there is an opportunity for insiders to 
take advantage of this private information. 
The process by which firms choose to have themselves appraised and the nature of the 
appraisal itself raises some critical issues that we examine in this article. First, insiders in REITs choose 
whether they will be appraised, when they will be appraised, and who will appraise them, giving rise to a 
clear selection bias. However, it also raises interesting questions about whether insiders can successfully 
predict when their companies are undervalued, and whether they use the appraisals as vehicles to make 
excess returns. Second, real estate appraisers carry out some of the functions that brokerage house 
analysts provide for other stocks, with two key differences: they work for the firm, and they have access 
to private information from the firm. By examining the results of the appraisals and their impact on 
market prices, we may be able to shed some light on whether this analysis has value to investors in the 
stock. Third, by examining differences in market reaction to insider trading accompanied by an appraisal 
                                                          
2 One exception is the Cornell and Sirri (1992) study of insider trading in Anheuser-Busch's 1982 tender offer for 
Campbell Taggart. They find that insider trading had a significant impact on the market price and increased both 
trading volume and liquidity. 
to insider trading alone, we can shed some light on whether the public is more likely to believe an 
insider trading signal when it is accompanied by an appraisal/audit. This has a direct bearing on whether 
signaling models with insiders as players must be extended to include analysts and auditors. Since 
signaling assumes that insider trades are observable, our measures of insider trading are based upon 
SEC filings, which can be accessed by market participants. 
In the first stage, we test the hypothesis that insider holdings increase in response to "good 
news" private information, which in turn is hypothesized to elicit a positive price response.3 The 
magnitude of this positive price response is posited to become more intense the larger the increase in 
the level of insider holdings. Conversely, insider holdings are hypothesized to decrease in response to 
"bad news" private information and this in turn is conjectured to elicit a negative price response. In 
addition to this, we examine the second stage in the sequence of information revelation, when the 
information is made public, to see if there is a market reaction to the public announcement of this 
private information and whether this reaction is related to the volume of insider trading preceding the 
announcement date. Finally, we examine the third stage in the information dissemination process, 
wherein public information is analyzed and repackaged in brokerage house reports, to see whether 
reports by advisory services possess the capacity to act as a secondary signal as well as influence market 
prices.4 
In examining whether insider trading acts as a signal of private information, we first establish 
that appraisals have informational value. This is accomplished by analyzing the composition of the 
appraised REITs in terms of the number of properties they own, and the number of regions and states 
that they operate in, and relating this portfolio composition to the divergence of appraised value from 
market value. Next, we evaluate the market's response to the public disclosure of these appraisals in 
earnings announcements and find that appraisals do not elicit a consistent price response from financial 
markets [i.e., positive (negative) appraisals are not accompanied by positive (negative) abnormal 
returns]. This finding is not necessarily inconsistent with our finding that appraisals have informational 
                                                          
3 John and Lang (1991) and John and Mishra (1990) hypothesize that the price reaction that takes place prior to the 
public announcement of information can be explained by a signaling model that allows insiders to change their 
holdings conditional on the arrival of new private information and that the resulting change in level of insider 
holdings in the firm is one of the signals available to convey this private information to the market. 
4 There is little consensus on whether investment advisory services that analyze and repackage public information 
have the capacity to earn excess returns or influence market prices. For example, Weinstein (1977) notes that 
changes in bond ratings occur several months after the capital markets have responded to fundamental changes in 
the bond's quality and that the ratings change itself does not cause changes in bond yields. In contrast, Copeland 
and Mayers (1982) examine the performance of stocks in different Value Line ranking classes, which are based on 
public information, and find evidence that these rankings have some power in predicting future returns. 
value, since there are at least two possible explanations that are consistent with this phenomena: (1) 
the first is that the appraisal information is not highlighted in earnings reports and hence remains 
unobserved; and (2) the second is that insiders trade on the appraisal information in the time that 
elapses between the appraisal and its public announcement. We reject the first hypothesis since there is 
no market reaction to the announcement of the appraisal information by Audit Realty, an investment 
information service that follows REITs. 
In contrast to this, we find strong support for the second hypothesis, which is consistent with 
our signaling story. The evidence suggests that insiders take advantage of their private information (on 
appraisals), buying (selling) after favorable (unfavorable) news is received by them before that 
information is made public. However, although the level of insider holdings increases (decreases) given 
private information that is "good (bad) news," the market reaction to this signal is not symmetrical in a 
statistical sense. We find evidence that unfavorable appraisals are followed by negative abnormal 
returns in the month of the appraisal as well as in the time period between the appraisal month and the 
public announcement date. Favorable appraisals were also followed by positive abnormal returns in the 
appraisal month, but the returns are much smaller and less significant. We attribute this difference in 
market behavior to the bias in the appraisal process, since insiders in REITs that choose to be 
reappraised probably expect to receive a favorable appraisal and are surprised when they do not. We 
confirm this by examining insider filings with the SEC around the reappraisal month and find that there 
is substantially more insider buying than selling before insiders receive the appraisals (whether positive 
or negative), and that this pattern is dramatically reversed if insiders receive a negative appraisal. We 
also find that the abnormal returns in the appraisal period are strongly influenced by both the nature of 
the appraisal and the net volume of insider trading (insider buying - insider selling), with positive 
(negative) appraisals and net insider buying (selling) eliciting significant positive (negative) returns. 
This article is developed and presented in four sections. In Section 1, we provide a background 
on the special features of REITs and the process of value reappraisal as well as a summary of existing 
research relating to REITs. In Section 2, we discuss the informational content of appraisals including how 
appraisers' estimates of value differ from those of stock analysts and why appraisals have informational 
value. In Section 3, we describe the sample and methodology used in the study. Our study includes 54 
equity and hybrid REITs and real estate companies, for which we have reappraisal data starting in 1982 
and ending in 1989. Results of our analysis are presented in Section 4. 
Institutional Background and Review of REIT Literature 
Background on Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) came into existence on January 1, 1961, as an amendment 
to the Internal Revenue Code (Sections 856-858). Under this amendment, a REIT is not taxed on 
distributed taxable income if it satisfies certain provisions. These requirements include: (1) at least 95 
percent (90 percent prior to 1980) of net annual taxable income must be distributed to shareholders; (2) 
at least 75 percent of annual gross income must come from rents, mortgage interest, gains from selling 
real estate, and dividends from investing in other REITs; (3) at least 75 percent of all assets must consist 
of real estate, mortgages on real estate, shares of other REITs, cash or government securities; (4) at least 
95 percent of the REIT's gross income must come from items qualifying under the 75 percent income 
test, dividends and interest income, and gains from the sale of stock and other securities;5 (5) at least 
100 shareholders must exist with no more than 50 percent of the shares held by five or fewer 
shareholders; (6) it must elect to be treated as a REIT; (7) real property must not be held primarily for 
sale in the ordinary course of business (gains from the sale of property held for less than four years must 
comprise less than 30 percent of gross income); and (8) trustees, directors, or employees of a REIT are 
restricted from actively managing or operating REIT property, although they are permitted to make 
property decisions if such decisions relate to the business of the REIT itself. These regulations are 
designed to ensure that REITs will be passive investment vehicles. If these provisions are met, then 
income is taxed only at the shareholder level. However, the trust is prohibited from passing through any 
operating losses to shareholders as a tax credit.6 
Real estate companies (RECOs), in contrast to REITs, do not function as passive investment 
vehicles. As such, RECOs are subject to double taxation except for those companies that are structured 
as publicly traded master limited partnerships. A real estate company is defined in the present study as 
                                                          
5 For the 95 percent test of income, an additional 20 percent of income must be either passive or qualified under 
the 75 percent rule. 
6 The unique characteristics associated with REITs have allowed researchers to use REITs as a controlled alternative 
to the standard corporation in investigating a variety of issues. Chiang, Ling, and Venkatesh (1989) use the 95 
percent taxable income payout requirement to test whether an information asymmetry cost exists for REITs when 
earnings and dividend announcements are separated from each other. Howe and Shilling (1988) use the fact that 
REITs do not pay any corporate taxes to examine several hypotheses concerning the market reaction to 
announcements of new security issues. Allen and Sirmans (1987) examine whether REIT mergers exhibit the same 
pattern of wealth distribution as corporate mergers given that the 75 percent passive income restriction for REITs 
rules out some classic corporate merger motives such as production synergy and monopolistic power. Palmon and 
Seidler (1978a, 1978b) and Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1984) investigate if market inefficiencies exist with respect to 
the current value reporting of real estate companies and real estate spin-off announcements, respectively. 
all real estate enterprises that are not structured as REITs and includes firms that develop, own, and/or 
manage a portfolio of real properties either on a sole ownership or partnership basis. Unlike REITs, 
RECOs are not constrained in the number of properties that can be sold in a given year, do not have to 
pay 95 percent of their earnings as dividends, and can engage in construction and development as well 
as any other type of real estate activity. 
Real Estate Appraisals: The Process 
In addition to the preceding characteristics of a REIT, some REITs as well as real estate 
companies hire professional appraisers to estimate a current value for their property holdings. This 
disclosure of current aggregate property value per share on fully diluted shares in REIT reports is a 
practice not followed by standard corporations and allows one to use appraised values as a private 
information attribute.7 To obtain current value, professional appraisers rely primarily on the income 
approach and to a lesser extent on the direct sales comparison approach in appraising income 
properties. The income approach to value initially involves estimating the net before-tax cash flows once 
normalized operations have occurred, where normalized operations are defined as property operations 
after the level of occupancy for the project is at least equal to that for the market as a whole. Next, a 
ratio known as the capitalization rate, which is analogous to the reciprocal of the price-earnings (P/E) 
multiple, is divided into the normalized before-tax net operating income to obtain a present value. This 
cap rate is estimated from comparable properties that have sold for which the analyst has information 
on the sales price and the net operating income. The appraiser examines the range of cap rates 
associated with the comparable properties and makes a judgment as to which rate is the most 
appropriate for the subject property.8 The direct sales comparison approach to value, like the income 
approach, relies on the sale of comparable properties. The intuition underlying this approach is that an 
                                                          
7 However, from 1979 to 1984, certain large publicly held corporations did report supplemental information to 
conform with Accounting Series Release (ASR) 190 and FASB Statement No. 33, which called for the disclosure of 
the estimated replacement cost of physical assets in 10K reports. ASR 190/FASB No. 33 was rescinded in part 
because financial analysts and investors were not using current cost data. For example, an Arthur Young & Co. 
survey (reported in The CPA Journal, ' However, from 1979 to 1984, certain large publicly held corporations did 
report supplemental information to conform with Accounting Series Release (ASR) 190 and FASB Statement No. 
33, which called for the disclosure of the estimated replacement cost of physical assets in 10K reports. ASR 
190/FASB No. 33 was rescinded in part because financial analysts and investors were not using current cost data. 
For example, an Arthur Young & Co. survey (reported in The CPA Journal, September 1983) revealed that most 
analysts believed that current cost estimates do not convey any new information. Consistent with this position, Ro 
(1981) found that the replacement cost disclosures did not affect the weekly transactions volume of common 
stock. 
8 Some appraisers also use the buyers' forecasted IRR for properties they have appraised in the past as the 
discount rate and apply this rate to a (5-10)-year forecast of cash flows from the property. 
informed investor will not pay more for a property than what other investors have recently paid for 
property similar with respect to location, age, size, scale, and quality of construction. Adjustments are 
made by the appraiser for deviations between the attributes of the property being appraised and 
characteristics of the comparable properties with adjustments made relative to the property being 
valued. A negative (positive) adjustment to the price of a comparable property is made if that 
comparable property possesses a positive (negative) feature (i.e., a newer building or more floors 
relative to the subject property). 
Consequently, the existence of comparable properties is important regardless of which 
approach is employed in the valuation process. The value of the appraiser is that he not only determines 
which properties are comparable to the property(ies) being appraised based on his experience, but he 
also has access to information on the sale of comparable properties, including their price, financing 
terms, cash flows, and property attributes, which may or may not be a matter of public record or might 
not be made available in a timely manner as comparable sales occur. The appraiser also possesses 
information about the regional economies in which the properties are located, which is indirectly 
factored into the valuation process. 
The Informational Content of Appraisals 
Appraiser's Estimate of Value versus Stock Analyst's Valuation of Firm 
There are some similarities in the functions performed by real estate appraisers and by 
brokerage analysts who follow stocks. Both bring an element of private information into the valuation 
process and use comparable firms in estimating the value of the firms. Analyst recommendations and 
appraisers' estimate of value both carry some weight as third-party estimates of firm value for investors 
and are likely to affect prices. However, some key differences exist between the appraisers' estimate of 
value and the stock analysts' recommendations on stock prices. First, analysts' estimates and valuations 
are generally made at the analysts' discretion, while real estate reappraisals are made at the discretion 
of the REIT being revalued. Consequently, there is likely to be a timing bias inherent in the latter, since 
firms that view themselves as undervalued are more likely to choose to have themselves reappraised 
than overvalued firms. Second, in contrast to analysts who are not handpicked or employed by the firms 
that they analyze, real estate appraisers are picked and remunerated by the REIT that they are 
revaluing.9 Here again, the potential for bias through choosing appraisers who are more likely to provide 
favorable recommendations cannot be ruled out. However, all properties in a REIT or RECO are 
reappraised at the same time, which minimizes the potential for further selection bias.10 These biases 
have to be weighed against the fact that the appraisers are provided with information about the 
properties that outsiders do not have. While analysts through their contacts or private research may 
unearth private information about the firm, real estate appraisers have a significant advantage since the 
firm not only supplies them with proprietary information on the properties being revalued, but they also 
bring with them proprietary information that other firms that they have valued have provided them in 
estimating the value of the properties and forecasting future market conditions. These differences have 
a couple of implications. The first is that REIT appraisals convey more private information than analyst 
recommendations. The second is that the discretionary nature of the reappraisal process makes 
favorable recommendations more likely than unfavorable ones. While this bias toward positive 
recommendations exists among stock analysts as well, the selection process for real estate appraisers 
accentuates the bias. 
The Appraisal Audit Process 
Since the decision to hire an outside, independent appraiser is discretionary as well as costly, 
questions that naturally arise are who decides on the appraisal audit and what is its economic 
justification. Interviews with the administrators of several REITs who do report appraised values in their 
financial reports reveal that the advisor to the trust, who administers the day-to-day operations of the 
trust, initially recommends to the board of directors or board of trustees (depending on whether a REIT 
is structured as a corporation or as a business trust, respectively) that the real estate of the REIT should 
be appraised and reported in the quarterly or annual report. Next, the board votes on the 
recommendation for an appraisal audit. In-house appraisals are performed for all properties in the REIT 
portfolio with all properties appraised at the same lime given board approval. An outside, independent 
MAI11 appraisal company is hired to verify the accuracy of the in-house estimate of the aggregate 
property value for the REIT portfolio. If the management's estimate of value is within 10 percent of the 
                                                          
9 While analysts have some independence, the 6rms that they analyze still exercise considerable power. Analysts 
are reluctant to conclude that they are overvalued, since they are likely to lose future access to firms. 
10 We thank a reviewer for pointing out that another selection bias will exist if all properties in a REIT are not 
reappraised at the same time and that this bias will be more severe the greater the diversity of the REIT portfolio if 
insiders in all REITs are well informed. 
11 MAI is an acronym for Member of the Appraisal Institute. To achieve this designation, an appraiser must meet 
certain educational requirements and have a number of years of practical experience. 
outside appraiser's value estimate, then the outside MAI appraiser issues a letter certifying the 
management's estimate of value. Otherwise, management must change their estimate of portfolio value 
to within 10 percent of the MAI's estimate of value in order to receive the valuation letter. 
Consequently, the appraisal process for REIT valuations is analogous to an independent accountant 
rendering his opinion on the financial condition of the firm after examining the books prepared by 
internal accountants of the firm. However, all REIT administrators interviewed stressed that the 
appraisal audit is not comparable to an accounting audit in the sense that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requires the latter but not the former to be undertaken for each firm. In addition to 
this, the FASB has strict GAAP guidelines for accounting audits, whereas no FASB guidelines exist on 
appraisal audits; it is strictly voluntary and in accordance with MAI principles and practices. After the 
MAI certification of value is rendered, board members of the firm receive information on the aggregate 
value of the property portfolio including both the in-house and MAI value estimates. According to REIT 
administrators interviewed, although board members can request in-house appraisals prior to receiving 
the outside, MAI appraisal, the standard procedure is to submit both sets of value estimates or only the 
MAI value estimate to board members once the outside, MAI appraisal is completed. Finally, the MAI 
aggregate estimate of value is released to the public through either the quarterly or annual report. 
These steps are summarized in Figure 1. 
Several reasons were cited as to why board members require appraisal audits. The foremost 
reason given is that the MAI estimate of value is the measure most investors and shareholders feel 
comfortable with since the belief is that an informationally efficient market does not exist for real 
estate. Reporting an MAI value estimate gives credibility to what the REIT properties are approximately 
worth. A related reason given is that the outside investment community places an emphasis on 
appraised values because historical cost is not a good indicator of equity. A few REIT administrators 
stated that not all of their board members were involved in real estate and as such they wanted to know 
from time to time what was the aggregate value of the REIT's property portfolio. Another reason given is 
that the appraised value is used as the point of departure in negotiations when individual properties are 
sold. Thus, an appraisal may signal an impending sale of a property.12 One REIT administrator indicated 
that the decision to report appraisal values arose in response to FASB Statement No. 33 and ASR 190, 
discussed in note 7, even though REITs were exempt from these regulations. None of the REIT 
administrators stated that the board of directors require appraisal audits to measure the performance 
                                                          
12 A reviewer has pointed out that this suggests that the REIT is about to expose itself to the uncertainty of the 
market and, since it has to pay out 95 percent of that sales price once received, it raises the question of whether 
there are any price consequences. 
of management. In fact, they emphasized that REIT management is not compensated based on appraisal 
values. 
Another question that arises is whether board members who decide on an appraisal audit 
usually, often, or never hold stock in the company? Interviews with the directors of investor relations for 
several REITs that have reappraisals performed and reported in their financial reports reveal that board 
members usually hold common stock in the company. However, the investor relation directors pointed 
out that all board members are free to purchase stock only during the open purchase period because of 
the SEC rule that there exists a certain period before and after board meetings and company press 
releases where insiders are not allowed to purchase stock in the company.13 
 
Why Appraisals have Informational Value 
Are appraisals informationally valuable? That appraisals contain important information for 
investors is revealed in a survey by Coopers & Lybrand of real estate analysts presented to the FASB in 
January 1983. This survey found that all analysts regarded current value disclosures as relevant with 
respect to the real estate industry. Moreover, 76 percent of the analysts felt that FASB should require 
the disclosure of the current appraised value of all real estate on a fully diluted per share basis, 
                                                          
13 Since board members who decide on an appraisal audit usually hold stock in the company, this might represent 
another motive for hiring an appraiser (e.g., when they decide to hire an appraiser, they are deciding to obtain a 
greater amount of private information). We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this fact. 
associating an independent auditor and/or appraiser with the disclosure for publicly held companies 
that own income-producing real estate. 
Are insiders not as fully informed about the value of their properties as appraisers since insiders 
are the ones who initiate the reappraisal process? Whether insiders possess as much information on the 
value of their properties as appraisers depends in part on whether information on sales price and 
financing on real estate in each locale is publicly available, and how diversified their property portfolio is 
with respect to location. A survey done for the Appraisal Institute, the governing body for appraisers, in 
April 1990 and reprinted in Table 1 reveals that complete information on sales price and financing terms 
on commercial and residential real estate is a matter of public record in only five states—Arizona, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington. In these states, buyers and/or sellers are required 
to sign an affidavit on the true price of the property. For all other states, either prices are not publicly 
available (16 states or 31 percent of the states), or if they are, no information on financing terms is 
available (36 states or 71 percent of the states). Even where prices are publicly available, some noise in 
prices might exist because of the manner of public disclosure. Price is disclosed in the public records 
either by the participants to the transaction signing an affidavit, purchasing conveyance stamps that 
reflect the total sales price or the downpayment, or reporting the sales price in the deed. Of the 35 
states in which sales prices are a matter of public record, only 13 states require participants to sign 
affidavits as to the transaction price. The majority of states (18) merely require that either the buyer or 
seller purchase conveyance stamps where each stamp represents a fraction of the property's value. 
While the value can, in theory, be imputed from transfer stamps, there are some instances, especially 
with foreign acquisitions of commercial properties, where purchasers buy more than the required 
amount of transfer stamps to hide the true transaction price. Furthermore, the price in the public record 
is not broken down into what part of the price is attributable to real estate and what portion represents 
personal property. In four states, the price of the property is reflected in the deed. In contrast to pricing 
information, only 15 states disclose financing information either through an affidavit or a deed in 
general. The extent of this financing information varies with each state, with some states requiring 
disclosure of only the loan amount but not the loan terms. No state currently requires that cash flow 
information be a matter of public record, although New York requires that property owners must report 
this information to the tax assessor who keeps the information confidential. In an attempt to reflect the 
availability of real estate sales and financing information in public records, the current study uses an 
arbitrary scoring process to reflect the transaction information (τ) available in each state i, where τ, is 
between zero and unity (0 < τi < 1). A score of zero is given to a state if no price of mortgage information 
is publicly available. If only mortgage information but not transaction price is a matter of public record, 
then a score of .25 is assigned to a state. On the other hand, if information on transaction prices but not 
mortgage financing is publicly available, then that state is given a .40. This score of .40 is increased to .50 
if state regulations require the buyer and/ or the seller to sign an affidavit verifying the transaction 
price. A state receives a score of .65 if both the transaction price and mortgage terms are accessible, 
while a perfect score of 1.00 is assigned to a state if an affidavit verifying the transaction price is also 
required. The weights used in the arbitrary scoring process were based on discussions with appraisers at 
the New York office of Cushman & Wakefield, as well as the 15 years of experience of the second author 
as a real estate broker and consultant. 
In Table 2, we report aggregate information on property characteristics for REITs and RECOs to 
give the reader some idea of the extent to which insiders of the firm can obtain publicly available 
information on transaction prices and mortgage terms for competing properties in their local real estate 
market as well as where most of the properties in REIT and RECO portfolios are located. In this table, it is 
revealed that price information is not publicly available for 27 percent and 19 percent of the properties 
for the REIT and RECO portfolios, respectively, in the aggregate. Some noise also exists in the price data 
for 77 percent of the REIT and RECO properties since no affidavit is required. In addition to this, no 
financing information is publicly available for 79 percent and 70 percent of the properties in the REIT 
and RECO portfolios, respectively, in the aggregate. In summary, information on prices and mortgage 
terms for most local real estate markets that REITs and RECOs invest in is not comprehensive in general. 
Table 2 also shows that a typical REIT portfolio consists of properties in 17 cities, 7 states, and 4 regions, 
with the number of cities varying from 3 to 35, the number of states varying from 1 to 17, and the 
number of regions varying from 1 to 8. Based on our arbitrary information score, information on 
transactions involving properties comparable to that in each REIT portfolio is publicly available for only 
43.3 percent of a REIT portfolio on average. This percentage varies from 2.4 percent for Weingarten 
Realty, which has most of its properties located in Houston, Texas, to 72.1 percent for Mony Real Estate. 
This aggregate percentage of public information available on the underlying real estate in the portfolio is 
computed as the sum of the products of the percentage (%) of the property portfolio located in state i 
(wi) multiplied by the percentage (%) of information on real estate prices and financing terms that is 
publicly available in state i (r,). Mathematically, 
Agg. % of publicly available information on properties in portfolio =∑ 𝑤𝑖𝜏𝑖.𝑁𝑖=1  
In terms of the percentage of properties by location, only 22 percent of the properties in a REIT portfolio 
are located in any one city. However, a higher concentration of properties exists with respect to the 
maximum number of properties located in one state (48 percent) or one region (59 percent) in general. 
This suggests that REITs tend to diversify across cities to a greater extent than across states and regions. 
A similar situation exists with respect to real estate companies. 
 
 
In summary, most of the REITs and RECOs in our sample have properties in several locales with 
prices and financing terms not publicly available in all of these locales. In states where information is 
publicly available, insiders must constantly go to the public records in each city where the property is 
located to obtain this information, thus incurring a monitoring cost.14 Insiders must also verify the sales 
and financing information because of noise in the public records. The magnitude of this monitoring cost 
depends on how many properties are located in different real estate markets. Consequently, insiders 
also extract valuable information from appraisals because appraisers use private information that they 
possess on the value, financing, and cash flows of comparable properties.15 The point is that while 
insiders may have been motivated to have their firms reappraised because they believed them to be 
undervalued, the reappraisals may not confirm their initial beliefs and do provide them with new 
information about the true value of their firms. As a consequence, even insiders in the REIT can be 
wrong in their assessments of the REIT's real value and can obtain considerable new information about 
the REIT's true value from the appraisal. The distribution of the differences between appraisal value and 
the market price at the start of the month that the appraisal is completed provides support for this 
notion. Of the 77 appraisals that are included in our sample, 43 represent positive appraisals (with an 
appraisal value greater than the market price at the time the appraisal is completed), and 33 are 
negative appraisals (with an appraisal value less than the market price). In Figure 2, we provide a 
frequency distribution for the difference between appraisal value and the market price, divided by the 
market price. The distribution is clearly nonnormal and positively skewed. 
The relationship between the informational value of real estate appraisals and the property 
composition of the appraised REITs is examined in Table 3, where we regress the square of the 
                                                          
14 There are commercial data vendors that sell data on each transaction for certain states such as Real Estate Data, 
Inc. (REDI). However, these vendors do not attempt to verify the accuracy of public information. 
15 In states where information is not publicly available, appraisers typically trade information on price and 
financing terms but not cash flows among themselves. Appraisers also seek out sellers, buyers, and their agents to 
verify pricing and financing information on each transaction, regardless of whether this is public information. 
differences in logs [as suggested in Manski (1991)] between the appraised value and the market price at 
the time of the appraisal (to correct for the nonnormalities noted above in Figure 2) on a number of 
measures of property composition: the number of properties owned, the number of cities that the REIT 
operates in, the number of types of property owned, and the number of states and regions in which the 
REIT operates.16 
In Table 3, we show that the absolute deviation between appraisal value and the market value 
at the time of the appraisal is related to the composition of the asset portfolio held by the REIT. More 
specifically, we are much more likely to observe large differences between appraised values and market 
values for REITs that operate in several states and regions. However, the number of properties and 
types of properties that a REIT owns are not significantly related to the informational value of the 
appraisal. One explanation for these findings is that insiders in REITs that have properties in a large 
number of states and regions find the proprietary information brought in by appraisers to be valuable in 
determining whether their firms are fairly valued since they are less likely to have a comparative 
information advantage on "localized" real estate market conditions. If the appraiser is right, this would 
suggest that the mispricing of REITs is directly related to the expense of aggregating regional 
information. An alternative explanation for this finding is that insiders and appraisers are equally well 
informed but their valuations of the properties are different (i.e., the findings in Table 3 just reflect 
heterogeneity in the information aggregation process). To test this, we regressed the square of the 
differences in logs between appraisal value and the market value after the appraisal had been 
completed and publicly revealed (in the earnings announcement) against measures of property 
composition and found no significant correlations with any of the measures. This suggests that the 
findings in Table 3 reflect more than information heterogeneity and at least partially reflect information 
brought in by the appraiser. Consequently, some support exists for the primary reason cited as to why 
board members require appraisal audits—namely, that the real estate market is informationally 
inefficient and therefore the MAI estimate of value is the measure most investors and shareholders feel 
comfortable with. 
                                                          
16 There is a high correlation between some of these measures. Hence, we report multiple univariate regressions. 
 
  
REITs with Appraisals versus REITs without Appraisals 
The fact that REITs and RECOs choose whether and when they are appraised and who appraises 
them exposes us to a potent problem of selection bias. We would expect to observe insiders in firms 
that view themselves as undervalued to be more likely to choose to have their properties reappraised 
than insiders in firms that view themselves as overvalued. Furthermore, they are likely to choose 
appraisers who will give them favorable appraisals. This bias toward positive appraisals is visible in 
Figure 2. 
To examine the extent of this selection bias, we first examine the differences between real 
estate firms that chose to have appraisals during the period of our sample and real estate firms that did 
not have any reappraisals during the period. The control sample of non-appraised firms was created 
from the COMPUSTAT file and includes all REITs and real estate corporations that were listed between 
1982 and 1989 and did not have any reappraisals during the period. Using the quarterly COMPUSTAT 
tape, we obtain data on four sets of variables: (1) size, as measured by the book value of total assets and 
the market value of equity; (2) value measures, estimated using price-earnings ratios, price-book value 
(P/BV) ratio, and price-cashflow (P/CF) ratios;17 (3) leverage measures, evaluated through debt-equity 
ratios; and (4) volume measures, as captured in average quarterly trading volume. The data were 
obtained for appraised firms only for the years in which they were appraised and for non-appraised 
firms for every year from 1982 to 1989- The cross-sectional average values for each measure were 
obtained for each year from 1982 to 1989 for non-appraised firms and compared to the corresponding 
cross-sectional averages for appraised firms in that year. In addition, the cumulated annual return in the 
250 trading days prior to each reappraisal is estimated for the appraised firm and for the portfolio of 
non-appraised firms in the control sample. The cross-sectional averages and standard errors for each of 
these measures is reported for appraised and non-appraised real estate firms in Table 4. 
The statistical significance of the differences between the two subsamples is captured in two 
statistics that are also reported in Table 4: a parametric t-statistic, which tests for significant differences 
between the subsample means, and a χ2 statistic from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. There is evidence here 
that appraised REITs are not significantly different from non-appraised REITs in size, trading volume, or 
leverage, but are likely to have lower price-earnings and price-book value ratios. To the extent that one 
accepts the notion that insiders in firms that have lower price-earnings and price-book value ratios are 
more likely to view themselves as undervalued, this adds to our concern of a selection bias. There seems 
to be little in preappraisal returns to differentiate between the two subgroups, with the appraised REITs 
having slightly higher returns in the preappraisal period. This is illustrated further in Figure 3, where the 
cumulated abnormal returns for the appraised and non-appraised REITs are shown for the 250 trading 
days prior to completion of an appraisal. 
                                                          
17 There is evidence in the literature that portfolios with low P/E ratios, low P/BV ratios, and low P/CF ratios earn 
abnormal returns. It is unclear whether this is the result of mismeasurement of risk or a reflection that stocks in 
these portfolios are more likely to be undervalued. Practitioners (such as analysts) continue to use these variables 
as proxies for value. 
We will examine statistical approaches that take into account the selection bias inherent in this 
process later in the next section. 
Sample and Methodology 
Sample Description 
Our sample includes 34 REITs and 20 RECOs that fit the following criteria. 
 They were traded on either the New York or American Stock exchanges between 1982 
and 1989 and have information available for the period on the CRSP daily returns 
database. 
 They have information available on quarterly earnings announcement dates and 
earnings per share on the COMPUSTAT quarterly database for the time period that they 
are listed on the CRSP tape. 
 They have at least one real estate reappraisal during the time period. The reappraisal 
data was obtained from the Realty Stock Review published by Audit Investments, and 
included the month in which the appraisal was completed and the appraised value. The 
date of the earnings announcement containing the appraisal value was obtained from 
the Wall Street Journal. In addition, the date on which this information was reported by 
Audit Investments, an information service that summarizes and reports on appraisal 
values to its subscribers, was also obtained. 
 To mitigate the issue of survivor bias, the sample also includes firms that were listed for 
only a portion of the period between 1982 and 1989 and were subsequently delisted for 
any reason. 
 
Notes 1 and 2 in Table 2 list the REITs and real estate companies in our sample, respectively. 
These firms had a total of 77 earnings reports with appraisal values in them and 357 other earnings 
reports during this time period. 
 The Sequence of Information Revelation and Testable Hypotheses 
Substantial evidence exists that there is insider trading around corporate announcements [John 
and Lang (1991), Copeland and Lee (1988), and Hirschey and Zaima (1989)] and that this insider trading 
is motivated by private information.18 In modeling this relationship, the following sequence of actions is 
usually assumed. First, private information about the firm's true value is revealed to insiders in the firm. 
Second, insiders use this information to trade on their own account and in the process reveal some or all 
of the information to other traders [which is the signaling feature modeled by John and Mishra (1990)]. 
This information is next revealed to the general public and the magnitude of the market reaction is 
determined both by the attributes of the information and by the signaling effects of insider trading 
preceding the public announcement. Finally, this information is repackaged and analyzed by secondary 
sources and then reported to the public. 
                                                          
18 Keown and Pinkerton (1981) also report substantial insider trading beginning one month before the 
announcement of corporate takeovers, and find that one half of the price reaction takes place before the 
announcement. In contrast, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find no evidence that the pre-bid run-up is greater for firms 
that have been identified in government insider trading allegations than for other target firms in their sample. 
Empirical researchers can generally observe the date of the public announcement with ease but 
are unable to identify when private information is revealed to insiders in the firm as well as the content 
of this information. Consequently, event studies have focused on market reactions to public 
announcements (of earnings, dividends, stock splits, etc.) but have not examined the effects that insider 
trading preceding these reports may have on their findings. Even those studies that have attempted to 
consider insider trading [Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Hirschey and Zaima (1989)] have focused their 
attention on public announcements and examined the period preceding these announcements for 
evidence of insider trading and abnormal price reaction. 
The unique feature of our dataset is that we can observe when private information is revealed 
to insiders and the content of the private information release as well as the public and secondary 
announcements of this information. Consequently, we have the opportunity to examine several 
hypotheses associated with each stage in the information revelation process. Once the decision to 
appraise, described in detail in the prior section, has been made, the information stages and the 
corresponding hypotheses are as follows. 
Information stage 1: Arrival of private information to public announcement. Insider holdings 
are posited to increase (decrease) in response to "good (bad) news" private information, which in turn 
should elicit a positive (negative) price response. Moreover, the magnitude of this price response is 
hypothesized to increase in intensity the larger the change in the level of insider holdings, which in turn 
is a function of the spread between the appraisal value and the market price at the time of the 
appraisal. 
Information stage 2: Public announcement of private information. No market reaction to the 
public announcement of private information is expected to obtain if changes in the level of insider 
holdings act as a signal of private information. However, a market reaction is likely if insiders are 
successful in camouflaging their trades. The extent to which insiders are able to conceal inside 
information depends in part on the time length of information stage 1. 
Information stage 3: Secondary release of information by analysts. Advisory services' reports, 
which analyze and repackage public information, are not hypothesized to act as a secondary signal to 
influence market prices unless residual information exists that the insider trading and the public 
announcement do not convey or unless the way that secondary sources process public information 
offers new insights to investors since these analysts concentrate on a given industry. 
Methodology 
There are three time periods upon which we focus our attention— the month in which the 
appraisal is made, the days around the earnings announcement containing the appraisal value, and the 
time period around the Audit Research Report, which contains the appraised value. There is no uniform 
standard followed in the timing of these events. Anywhere from four weeks to four months elapse 
between the appraisal month and the earnings announcement date, and the Audit Research Report lags 
the announcement date by a few weeks. The median time period between the first of the appraisal 
month and the earnings report date for firms in our sample is 68 trading days, and the median time 
period between the earnings report date and the secondary report date is 38 trading days. 
To investigate the impact of the arrival of private information on insider trading, we follow John 
and Lang (1991) and first compute standardized measures of insider trading intensity. These measures 
reflect net insider trading for the period between the appraisal and the announcement date as well as a 
holdout period of six months starting two years before the appraisal date.19 The first measure, denoted 
ISPI1, deals with the aggregate number of insider trades, while the second measure, denoted ISPI2, 
focuses alternatively on the dollar volume of insider trades. Mathematically, 
ISPI1 = (NP - NS)/(NP + NS),   - 1 ≤ ISPI1≤ 1, 
ISPI2 = (DSP - DSS)/(DSP + DSS),   - 1 ≤ ISPI2 ≤ 1, 
where NP/NS is the aggregate number of insider purchases/sale transactions in period t and DSP/DSS is 
the dollar amount of insider purchases/sales in time period t. 
The purpose of the standardization is to scale for the size effect, because firms with more 
insiders have more insider trading, and to correct for any biases that may exist in insider trading, since 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) find a positive bias with respect to net insider buying that may lead to trading-
induced prediction errors. Both ISPI1 and ISPI2 are bounded above by 1 and below by - 1. 
To compute the impact of the reappraisals, we estimate abnormal returns during each of the 
time periods in the information revelation sequence using a market model with parameters estimated 
from daily returns starting 120 days before the beginning of the appraisal month and ending 11 days 
before: 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 =  𝑅𝑗𝑡 −  �𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡�, 
                                                          
19 The year and a half preceding the appraisal date is likely to be contaminated by a bias toward insider buying 
since insiders in undervalued firms are more likely to choose to have themselves reappraised. 
where ARjt, is the abnormal return for firm; on day t, at and 0, are the market model parameters, and 
Rmt is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index on day t.20 
In addition to examining the abnormal return around the three significant events (i.e., the 
appraisal, the public announcement, and the secondary announcement), we also compute two 
measures of cumulated returns. The first, which we use to measure the leakage of private information, 
is obtained by cumulating the return starting on the first trading day of the appraisal month and 
continuing through the public announcement (earnings report): 
𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑗 = � 𝑅𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑒−1
𝑡=𝑡𝑎
 
where ta is the first trading day of the appraisal month, te is the earnings announcement date, and IARj is 
the cumulated return for firm j. The second measure that we compute cumulates the return from the 
earnings announcement date to the day preceding the secondary announcement date: 
𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑗 = � 𝑅𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑠−1
𝑡=𝑡𝑒
 
where ts is the report date for the Audit Research Report and PARj is the cumulated return for firm j. This 
is used to evaluate the cumulated effect of the public announcement of the appraisal. 
Rational Insiders/Outsiders and Abnormal Returns 
There is clear evidence in Table 4 that there are significant differences between REITs that 
choose to reappraise themselves and REITs that do not. If insiders and outsiders are rational about 
incorporating these expectations into their behavior, there is likely to be a selection bias. There are two 
broad approaches for dealing with this bias. Malatesta and Thompson (1985) present a model of stock 
price reactions to partially anticipated events, where they incorporate stock price movements in periods 
when no event occurs to estimate the economic importance of the event. In their model, the returns on 
a stock can be written as 
 
where Rjt is the rate of return to firm j at time t, Rmt is the rate of return to market portfolio at time t, Rft 
is the risk-free rate at time t, and djt equals unity if an event occurs at t and zero otherwise. Malatesta 
and Thompson (1985) assume that events occur at a constant frequency qj per period, and that the 
                                                          
20 Alternative approaches were used to estimate abnormal returns with no qualitative change in our conclusions. 
expected economic impact vj of the event is constant. Under the assumption that events are partially 
anticipated and that their expected economic impacts are positive, their model yields three hypotheses. 
 H1: αj=qjvj<0; tests the joint hypothesis that the economic impact of the event is 
positive and that acquisition attempts are partially, but not perfectly, anticipated. 
 H2: ϒj= vj > 0; tests the hypothesis that the expected economic impact of the event is 
positive. 
 H3: αj+ ϒj=(1-qj)vj>0; tests the hypothesis that the expected announcement effect is 
positive if the expected economic impact is positive. 
We use the Malatesta-Thompson approach to examine the extent to which reappraisals, in 
aggregate, are good news and the degree to which they are anticipated by investors. To apply the 
approach, we collected monthly return data from January 1983 to December 1989 for each firm in our 
sample and for the value-weighted NYSE composite index. Three dummy variables were defined: 
 
The regression described in Equation (4) was run using each of these dummy variables separately for 
each firm in the sample and the crosssectional averages of the regression coefficients are reported in 
Table 5. 
 
The intercept is negative for all three events—the reappraisal, the earnings report, and the 
secondary report. However, the intercepts are small and statistically insignificant (the average ^-statistic 
is not significantly different from zero). The coefficient on the dummy variable for the reappraisal is 
positive, suggesting that reappraisals are generally considered as "good" news, and the average f-
statistic is statistically significant. The average coefficient on the dummy variable for the earnings report 
is negative, but of the 36 firm-specific regressions only 17 have positive coefficients, suggesting that 
earnings reports do not provide significant information to financial markets about appraisals. The 
dummy variable for the secondary report has, on average, a positive coefficient, but the ^-statistics are 
generally not significant. The average f-statistics for the sum of the intercept and the dummy coefficient, 
used to test the bias-adjusted announcement effect (Hypothesis H3 in the Malatesta-Thompson 
framework), are not significant for the earnings and secondary reports but are significant at the 5 
percent level for the reappraisal. In summary, the effect of REIT appraisals on returns seems to be small. 
Real estate reappraisals, on average, seem to convey good news to financial markets, but the 
subsequent earnings and secondary reports seem to convey little new information. 
The other approach to dealing with selection bias is from the literature on limited dependent 
variables. Acharya (1988, 1989) extends the sequential signaling equilibrium in Harris and Raviv (1985) 
to develop consistent estimators of abnormal returns in event studies. Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams 
(1990) extend this approach to cover cross-sectional regressions of announcement effects on exogenous 
variables. They point out that standard OLS and GLS estimators are inconsistent when the event is 
voluntary and investors are rational, and suggest consistent maximum-likelihood estimators of 
coefficients, which they apply to horizontal mergers. We apply the two-step approach described in 
Acharya to take into account the potential biases induced by the fact that appraisals are voluntary 
events initiated by insiders in REITs. In the first stage, we estimate the prior probability (<pj) of an 
appraisal for a REIT from a probit analysis, run on all REITs with data available on an annual basis from 
1982 to 1989, using the independent variables listed in Table 4—the book value of total assets, the 
average quarterly trading volume, the price-earnings ratio, the price-book value ratio, and the debt-
equity (D/E) ratio. The results are summarized in Table 6 for each year of the sample. 
As in Table 4, it is clear that firms with low price-book value and price-earnings ratios are much 
more likely to choose to have appraisals than other firms. The probabilities (∅𝑗) estimated from these 
probit analyses are used in conjunction with the cumulative probabilities (Фj), to estimate ϒj and 𝛾𝚥� , 
where 
𝛾𝑗 = ∅𝑗 Ф𝑗,�  𝑦𝚥� = ∅𝑗/(1 −Ф𝑗). 
In the second stage, we regress excess returns estimated during the appraisal period (ϵ) against ϒj and 
𝑦𝚥� : 
 
The coefficient 𝜋 in the regression is a measure of the market response to the announcement of an 
appraisal by a REIT, conditioned on insiders being rational in choosing to have an appraisal. A positive w 
implies that the appraisal effect (πϒj) is positive, and the mean of this appraisal effect is the cumulated 
abnormal return. While the Malatesta- Thompson approach measures the difference between expected 
abnormal returns due to the event and the expected abnormal returns due to the nonevent, the limited-
dependent variable approach explicitly allows for three aspects of corporate events—that these events 
are decided by insiders, that outsiders can estimate the probabilities of these events using public 
information, and that these probabilities can change over time. The measure of abnormal returns from 
Equation (5) should therefore be free from the sample bias that standard event study methodology 
exposes us to and that persists in the Malatesta- Thompson approach. The results of the regressions, for 
positive and negative appraisals, are reported in Table 7. 
We examine excess returns during three periods—the month of the appraisal, the 20 trading 
days around the earnings announcement that contains the appraisal, and the 20 trading days around the 
secondary report—and estimate the coefficients in Equation (5). For positive appraisals, the regression 
coefficient (π) is positive during all three periods. However, the t-statistics indicate statistical significance 
only for returns in the earnings report period. These results indicate that positive appraisals elicit 
positive abnormal returns when they are reported in earnings reports, even though these reports reach 
financial markets several months after insiders receive the appraisal value. For negative appraisals, the 
regression coefficient (x) is negative in all three periods, but is statistically significant only in the 
appraisal month. The negative abnormal returns in the appraisal month indicate that insiders trade on 
their private information and affect prices in the process. The public announcement of the negative 
appraisal does not elicit much response from markets, suggesting that investors have incorporated the 
information into prices prior to their public release. The disparity in market response to positive and 
negative appraisals will be analyzed in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
 
 Results 
The results are presented in five parts. First, we compute the abnormal returns around the 
earnings announcement date to examine whether public announcements of favorable (unfavorable) 
appraisals are accompanied by positive (negative) market responses. Second, we estimate the abnormal 
returns around the secondary report date, when the Audit Realty Report comes out, to see if the 
republication of information that is already public has any informational value. Third, we report on the 
cumulated abnormal returns in the appraisal month, the period between the appraisal month and the 
earnings report date, and the period between the earnings report and secondary report dates to 
evaluate the effects of insider trading. Fourth, we examine the extent of insider trading both prior to 
and following reappraisals using insider filings with the SEC. Finally, we evaluate the effects of appraisal 
values and insider trading on abnormal returns in the appraisal and earnings announcement periods. 
The sequence of events described here is like the sequence in Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams 
(1990). They estimate cumulated abnormal returns around merger announcements and attempt to 
relate the announcement effects to exogenous characteristics of firms and industries. They point out the 
problems of truncation bias and bias induced by prior anticipation of insider actions on the 
measurement of cumulated abnormal returns using standard OLS or GLS techniques and correct for 
these biases by using maximum-likelihood estimators. We, therefore, steer away from cross-sectional 
regressions in trying to explain announcement effects around the release of reappraisal information and 
attempt to provide bias-corrected announcement period returns at each stage. 
Market Reaction to the Public Announcement of Appraisal Values 
In Table 8, we examine market reactions to earnings announcements with real estate appraisals 
in them. We use the difference between the appraised value and the market price on the earnings 
announcement date as a measure of whether the appraisal is favorable (appraised value > market price) 
or unfavorable (appraised value < market price). The cross-sectional averages (and the corresponding t-
statistics for significance) of the abnormal returns, starting 10 days before the earnings report and 
ending 10 days after, are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8 shows no evidence of any significant announcement day effects associated with the 
appraisals. Negative appraisals are accompanied by positive abnormal returns (though the ^-statistic 
reveals no significance) on the announcement date, while positive appraisals have abnormal returns 
close to zero on the report date. If returns are cumulated over the announcement period (days - 1 0 to 
+10 around the earnings report date), then positive appraisals are associated with marginally significant 
positive abnormal returns but negative appraisals are not associated with significant negative abnormal 
returns. When we correct the cumulated return for sample bias (using the limited dependent variable 
approach), our findings do not change materially.21 The cumulated abnormal return associated with 
positive appraisals declines to 1.14 percent and the t-statistics become insignificant. This return 
behavior cannot be explained by surprises in the earnings announcements that accompany the 
appraisals, since there is little correlation between the earnings surprise and whether the appraisal is 
positive or negative.22 
The absence of an announcement effect around the public release of appraisal information is 
not necessarily inconsistent with our argument in the prior section that appraisals do have informational 
value, since at least two potential explanations exist for the lack of correlation between the return 
behavior and the nature of the appraisal. First, investors may not be aware of the appraisals and hence 
not react to them until they are provided with the information by external services because REITs do not 
emphasize appraisal values in their initial earnings announcements.23 Since REITs are much more likely 
to deemphasize negative appraisals than positive appraisals, this may also help to explain why positive 
appraisals are associated with positive abnormal returns while negative appraisals do not have a 
                                                          
21 We obtained sample-bias adjusted returns using both the limited dependent variable approach as well as the 
Malatesta-Thompson approach. Since the results are similar, only the results from the former are reported. 
22 Of the 28 negative appraisals, 13 were accompanied by positive earnings surprises (current EPS > EPS same 
quarter last year) and 15 by negative earnings surprises. Of the 26 positive appraisals, 12 were accompanied by 
positive earnings surprises and 14 by negative earnings surprises. 
23 Of the 77 earnings reports that appeared on the broadtape, we found only three instances where appraisal 
values were reported either on a per-share or total value basis. All three reports contained positive appraisals. 
corresponding negative impact on returns. Second, since the appraisal value is known well in advance of 
the earnings report to insiders in the firm, prices may adjust to the information in them prior to their 
public release if these insiders trade on the information. 
  
Market Reaction to the Secondary Announcement of Appraisal Values 
If the first explanation holds, then the release of the appraisal information by Audit Investments 
to its subscribing customers should be accompanied by price changes consistent with the content of the 
appraisal. We report the cross-sectional averages of the abnormal returns, starting 10 days before the 
secondary report date and ending 10 days after, in Table 8. Little evidence of a significant market 
response to secondary reports is revealed in Table 8. Neither positive nor negative appraisals are 
associated with statistically significant abnormal returns on the announcement date. The cumulative 
return over all the trading days (—10 to +10) is positive for both favorable appraisals and unfavorable 
appraisals, but the t-statistics are not significant for either. These findings are unaffected by the 
adjustment for sample bias, using the limited dependent variable approach. 
 
Abnormal Returns Prior to the Public Release of Appraisal Values 
If insider holdings increase (decrease) in response to "good (bad) news" private information, and 
this signal elicits a positive (negative) price response, then changes in insider holdings convey the 
information contained in the appraisal to financial markets. The actual announcement of the appraisal 
value may then have a much smaller impact on market prices. To examine whether this explanation 
holds, we compute and report the cumulated abnormal return over each of the following sequential 
time periods in Table 9 for favorable and unfavorable appraisals: (1) for all the trading days in the month 
in which the appraisal is made; (2) from the end of the appraisal month to 11 days before the earnings 
announcement; (3) from 10 days before the earnings report to 10 days after; (4) from 11 days after the 
earnings announcement to 11 days before the Audit Research Report; and (5) from 10 days before the 
Audit Research Report to 10 days after. 
The evidence in Table 9 seems to indicate differences in price behavior do exist in response to 
favorable and unfavorable appraisals. Unfavorable appraisals are followed by significant negative 
abnormal returns in the appraisal month (with a t-statistic of 2.36), marginal negative abnormal returns 
in the period between the appraisal month and the earnings report, and insignificant negative returns 
during the earnings announcement period and the period immediately following the announcement 
period, with the cumulative returns slightly positive in the period surrounding the secondary report. 
Correcting for sample bias, using the limited dependent variable approach, results in more negative 
returns in the appraisal month, but the returns during the earnings and secondary report periods are 
not significantly different from zero. In contrast, although favorable appraisals are followed by positive 
abnormal returns in the appraisal month, the returns are small and are not statistically significant. The 
period between the appraisal month and the earnings report is also characterized by positive abnormal 
returns of marginal statistical significance. The most significant abnormal returns with favorable reports 
seem to be earned in the period surrounding the earnings announcement and in the following period. 
When the correction for sample bias is made, the cumulated returns are not significantly different from 
zero in the appraisal month and during the earnings and secondary reports.24 To illustrate this difference 
further, we estimate the proportion of abnormal returns earned in the period both before and after the 
earnings report (i.e., before the appraisal was made public) for positive and negative appraisals. For 
negative appraisals, most of the negative abnormal returns accrue before the earnings report; while for 
positive appraisals, most of the positive abnormal returns accrue after the earnings report. The 
                                                          
24 We also examined the extent to which the empirical price responses in later stages (i.e., the earnings report and 
the secondary report) were dependent upon price responses at earlier stages (such as in the reappraisal month) by 
computing the correlation coefficients between the cumulated returns over each of these periods. The correlation 
coefficients between returns in the three periods are as follows and suggest a positive dependence: 
 
significant positive abnormal returns in the period between the earnings and the secondary reports for 
favorable appraisals can be attributed to investors becoming aware, albeit belatedly, of the appraisal 
value. The reason for the delay in incorporating information in prices may be due to the fact that 
earnings reports on the newswire, which are used to determine our report dates, often do not contain 
information on the appraisals. 
Insider Trading Prior to the Public Release of Appraisal Values 
The dichotomous response of the market to favorable and unfavorable appraisals may be traced 
to the nature of the appraisal process. Since REITs choose when they are appraised and who appraises 
them, an unfavorable appraisal is also likely to be much more of a surprise to insiders than a favorable 
one, leading presumably to insider selling and negative abnormal returns. Favorable appraisals, on the 
other hand, confirm insiders' beliefs about their firms' future prospects and should not result in 
substantial insider trading. This explanation is supported by an examination of insider trading data 
obtained from insider trading reports filed with the SEC by directors, beneficial owners (more than 10 
percent of outstanding equity), and officers of the firm. First, we report on all insider transactions in the 
six months preceding the appraisal month in panel A of Table 10 for the firms in our sample, classified by 
the type of appraisal (favorable or unfavorable) . There is a clear positive bias in insider trades before 
both positive and negative reappraisals, with more insider buying than insider selling in the time period. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that insiders who believe that their firms are undervalued are 
much more likely to have them reappraised than insiders in other firms. There also seems to be some 
evidence of more insider buying prior to positive appraisals than negative appraisals, though the 
difference between the two classes on this score is not statistically significant.25 
To examine how the reappraisals affect insiders' views on their firms (and their holdings), we 
report on insider transactions between the reappraisal month and the earnings reports in panel B of 
Table 10. There is a dramatic shift toward insider selling after negative appraisals. Of the 68 insider 
transactions between the month of an unfavorable appraisal and the corresponding earnings report, 48 
were open-market sales and six represented disposal by gift. There were only nine open-market 
purchases during the same period. In contrast, the trend toward insider buying that we noted in Table 
10 is strengthened if the appraisal contains positive information. Of the 45 insider transactions reported 
between the month of a favorable appraisal and the earnings report, there are 13 acquisitions by 
                                                          
25 The insider trading measure for the preappraisal period was 0.3143 for positive appraisals and 0.1923 for 
negative appraisals. The f-statistic, testing for differences between these two means, was not significant. 
exercise of options, 17 acquisitions of shares through a plan, and 10 open-market purchases. There were 
only five open-market sales. A comparison of the standardized insider trading measures in the appraisal 
and holdout periods reveals strong support for the hypothesis that insiders trade on appraisals, since 
insider trading measures following positive (negative) appraisals are significantly greater (lower) than 
the corresponding statistics for the holdout period. 
 
To illustrate the impact of insider trading on excess returns, we classify firms on the basis of the 
nature of the appraisal (positive or negative) and the net value of insider trading (i.e., whether insider 
buying exceeds insider selling or vice versa) in Table 11. We report the excess returns in the appraisal 
period, the earnings announcement period, and the secondary announcement period for each appraisal 
subgroup and come to the following conclusions.26 First, insider trading clearly has an impact on 
abnormal returns in the appraisal period. For both positive and negative appraisals, appraisals with net 
                                                          
26 We estimated sample-bias adjusted CARs as well. While we have enough observations to estimate the 
coefficients for the positive appraisal/net insider buying and negative appraisal/net insider selling combinations, 
we do not have enough observations to estimate coefficients for the other two combinations. 
insider selling (insider selling > insider buying) in the period between the appraisal and the earnings 
announcement are characterized by much more negative returns in the appraisal month than appraisals 
with net insider buying (with significant F-statistics). Second, net insider trading does not appear to 
impact on excess returns in the earnings and secondary announcement periods in a significant manner. 
Third, the excess returns in all three subperiods are more positive following positive appraisals than 
negative appraisals. Consequently, the results in this table support our proposition that while appraisals 
contain information, insider trading conveys information about these appraisals to financial markets in 
the period before they are made public.27 The other interesting finding that emerges from Table 11 is 
that insider trading has a much larger impact on market prices when accompanied by an appraisal. 
Conclusion 
REITs that choose to have themselves appraised offer a unique opportunity to examine how 
private information is used by insiders in these firms. There are several interesting findings that emerge 
from our study. From our examination of REITs that choose to appraise themselves, we can conclude 
that insiders are successful in predicting when their firms are undervalued and hire appraisers to 
communicate this to the market. We establish that appraisals have informational value by analyzing the 
composition of the appraised REITs, in terms of the number of properties they own, and the number of 
regions and states that they operate in, and relating it to the divergence of appraised value from market 
value. This informational value can be traced to appraisers bringing in data from other appraisals, which 
becomes valuable when combined with the firm's internal data on property performance. Insiders seem 
to believe this appraised value and trade on it to make a profit, and, in the process, reveal their 
information to outsiders. Consequently, the public disclosure of appraisals does not elicit a significant 
response from financial markets. 
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